We present algorithmic applications of an approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem. The theorem states that given a set of vectors X in R d , for every vector in the convex hull of X there exists an ε-close (under the p-norm distance, for 2 ≤ p < ∞) vector that can be expressed as a convex combination of at most b vectors of X, where the bound b depends on ε and the norm p and is independent of the dimension d. This theorem can be derived by instantiating Maurey's lemma, early references to which can be found in the work of Pisier (1981) and Carl (1985) . However, in this paper we present a self-contained proof of this result.
. This, in particular, gives us a polynomial-time approximation scheme for Nash equilibrium in games with fixed column sparsity s. Moreover, for arbitrary bimatrix gamessince s can be at most n-the running time of our algorithm matches the best-known upper bound, which was obtained by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta (2003) .
The approximate Carathéodory's theorem also leads to an additive approximation algorithm for the densest k-bipartite subgraph problem. Given a graph with n vertices and maximum degree d, the developed algorithm determines a k × k bipartite subgraph with density within ε (in the additive sense) of the optimal density in time n 
Categories and Subject Descriptors

INTRODUCTION
Carathéodory's theorem is a fundamental dimensionality result in convex geometry. It states that any vector in the convex hull of a set X in R d can be expressed as a convex combination of at most d + 1 vectors of X.
1 This paper considers a natural approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem where the goal is to seek convex combinations that are close enough to vectors in the convex hull. Specifically, this approximate version establishes that given a set of vectors X in the p-unit ball 2 with norm p ∈ [2, ∞), for every vector µ in the convex hull of X there exists an ε-closeunder the p-norm distance-vector µ that can be expressed as a convex combination of 4p ε 2 vectors of X. A notable aspect of this result is that the number of vectors of X that are required to express µ , i.e., 4p ε 2 , is independent of the underlying dimension d. This theorem can be derived by instantiating Maurey's lemma, early references to which can be found in the work of Pisier [27] and Carl [9] . However, in this paper we present a self-contained proof of this result, which we proceed to outline below. The author was made aware of the connection with Maurey's lemma after a preliminary version of this work had appeared.
To establish the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem we use the probabilistic method. Given a vector µ in the convex hull of a set X ⊂ R d , consider a convex combination of vectors of X that generates µ. The coefficients in this convex combination induce a probability distribution over X and the mean of this distribution is µ. The approach is to draw b independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from this distribution and show that with positive probability the sample mean, with an appropriate number of samples, is close to µ under the p-norm distance, for p ∈ [2, ∞). Therefore, the probabilistic method implies that these exists a vector close to µ that can be expressed as a convex combination of at most b vectors, where b is the number of samples we drew.
Note that in this context applying the probabilistic method is a natural idea, but a direct application of this method will not work. Specifically, a dimension-free result is un-likely if we first try to prove that the ith component of the sample mean vector is close to the ith component of µ, for every i ∈ [d]; since this would entail a union bound over the number of components d. Bypassing such a component-wise analysis requires the use of atypical ideas. We are able to accomplish this task and, in particular, bound (in expectation) the p-norm distance between µ and the sample mean vector via an interesting application of Khintchine inequality (see Theorem 1) .
Given the significance of Carathéodory's theorem, this approximate version is interesting in its own right. The key contribution of the paper is to substantiate the algorithmic relevance of this approximate version by developing new algorithmic applications. Our applications include additive approximation algorithms for (i) Nash equilibria in two-player games, and (ii) the densest bipartite subgraph problem. These algorithmic results are outlined later in this section. The full version of the paper [4] extends the approximate version to address particular generalizations of Carathéodory's theorem.
Algorithmic Applications
Approximate Nash Equilibria.
Nash equilibria are central constructs in game theory that are used to model likely outcomes of strategic interactions between self-interested entities, like human players. They denote distributions over actions of players under which no player can benefit, in expectation, by unilateral deviation. These solution concepts are arguably the most well-studied notions of rationality and questions about their computational complexity lie at the core of algorithmic game theory. In recent years, hardness results have been established for Nash equilibrium, even in two-player games [11, 13] . But, the question whether an approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time still remains open. Throughout this paper we will consider the standard additive notion of approximate Nash equilibria that are defined as follows: a pair distributions, one for each player, is said to be an ε-Nash equilibrium if any unilateral deviation increases utility by at most ε, in expectation.
We apply the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem to address this central open question. Specifically, we prove that in a bimatrix game with n × n payoff matrices A, B, i.e., a two-player game with n actions for each player, if the number of non-zero entries in any column of A + B is at most s then an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game can be computed in time n O log s ε 2
. Our result, in particular, shows that games with fixed column sparsity s admit a polynomialtime approximation scheme (PTAS) for Nash equilibrium. Along the lines of zero-sum games (which model strict competition), games with fixed column sparsity capture settings in which, except for particular action profiles, the gains and losses of the two player balance out. In other words, such games are a natural generalization of zero-sum games; recall that zero-sum games admit efficient computation of Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [26] ).
It is also worth pointing out that for an arbitrary bimatrix game the running time of our algorithm is n O log n ε 2 , since s is at most n. Given that the best-known algorithm for computing ε-Nash equilibrium also runs in time n O log n ε 2 [24] , for general games the time complexity of our algorithm matches the best-known upper bound. Overall, this result provides a parameterized understanding of the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibrium in terms of a very natural measure, the column sparsity s of the matrix A + B.
Our framework can address other notions of sparsity as well. Specifically, if there exist constants α, β ∈ R+ and γ ∈ R such that the matrix αA + βB + γ1n×n has column or row sparsity s, then our algorithm can be directly adopted to find an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) in time
; here, 1n×n is the all-ones n × n matrix.
3 Additionally, the same running-time bound can be achieved for approximating Nash equilibrium in games wherein both matrices A and B have column or row sparsity s. Note that this case is not subsumed by the previous result; in particular, if the columns of matrix A and the rows of matrix B are sparse, then it is not necessary that A + B has low column or row sparsity.
We also refine the following result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [16] : They develop a PTAS for bimatrix games that admit an equilibrium with small, specifically O 1 n , probability values. This result is somewhat surprising, since such small-probability equilibria have large, Ω(n), support, and hence are not amenable to, say, exhaustive search. We show that if a game has an equilibrium with probability values O . Since s ≤ n, we get the result of [16] as a special case.
Densest Bipartite Subgraph.
In the densest k-bipartite subgraph problem (DkBS) we are given a graph and the objective is to find size-k vertex subsets, S and T , such that the number of edges (of the graph) between S and T is maximized. Here, the density of a bipartite subgraph, induced by vertex subsets S and T , is defined to be the number of edges between the two subsets divided by |S||T |. DkBS is a natural variant of the standard densest k-subgraph problem (see, e.g., [1] and references therein), in which the objective is to determine the densest subgraph of size k. Note that in densest subgraph problem (DkS) all the edges in the induced subgraph are considered, whereas in DkBS only the edges between the two vertex subsets, S and T , matter. DkS is computationally hard and it is shown in [1] that a constant-factor approximation for DkS is unlikely. This result indicates that DkBS is hard to approximate within a constant factor as well.
In this paper we focus on an additive approximation for DkBS. In particular, our objective is to determine a k × k bipartite subgraph whose density is close (in the additive sense) to the optimal. A lower bound for additive approximations in general graphs follows from the work of Hazan and Krauthgamer [19] . Specifically, the reduction established in [19] rules out an additive PTAS for DkBS, under complexity theoretic assumptions. 4 In terms of upper bound, the result of Alon et al. [3] presents an algorithm for this problem that runs in time exponential in the rank of the adjacency matrix. Here we develop the following com-plementary upper bound: given a graph with n vertices and maximum degree d, a k × k bipartite subgraph with density ε close to the optimal can be computed in time n
The full version of the paper [4] details an algorithm with the same time complexity for additively approximating the normalized densest k-subgraph problem (NDkS). We note that in NDkS density of a subgraph is defined to be number of edges in the subgraph divided by k 2 , i.e., the density is normalized.
Related Work
Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem.
In this paper we provide a self-contained proof of the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem, employing the Khintchine inequality (see Theorem 1) , and use the theorem to develop new approximation algorithms. As mentioned earlier, the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem can also be obtained by instantiating Maurey's lemma, which, in particular, appears in the analysis and operator theory literatures; see, e.g., [27, 9, 7] .
The computation of equilibria is an active area of research. Nash equilibria is known to be computationally hard [11, 13] , and in light of these findings, a considerable effort has been directed towards understanding the complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium. Results in this direction include both upper bounds [24, 21, 14, 20, 15, 22, 17, 6, 29, 30, 3, 2] and lower bounds [19, 12, 8] . In particular, it is known that for a general bimatrix game an approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in quasi-polynomial time [24] . Polynomial time algorithms have been developed for computing approximate Nash equilibria for fixed values of the approximation factor ε; the best-known result of this type shows that a 0.3393-approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time [29] . In addition, several interesting classes of games have been identified that admit a PTAS [20, 16, 30, 3, 2] . For example, the result of Alon et al. [3] provides a PTAS for games in which the sum of the payoff matrices, i.e., A + B, has logarithmic rank. Our result is incomparable to such rank based results, since a sparse matrix can have high rank and a low-rank matrix can have high sparsity.
Chen et al. [10] considered sparsity in the context of games and showed that computing an exact Nash equilibrium is hard even if both the payoff matrices have a fixed number of non-zero entries in every row and column. It was observed in [16] that such games admit a trivial PTAS. 5 Note that we study a strictly larger class of games and provide a PTAS for games in which the row or column sparsity of A + B is fixed.
Densest Bipartite Subgraph.
The best-known (multiplicative) approximation ratio for the densest k-subgraph problem is n (1/4+o(1)) [5] . But unlike this result, we address additive approximations in this paper. Our approximation algorithm for DkBS is based on solving a bilinear program that was formulated by Alon et al. [3] . Specifically, this bilinear program was used in [3] to develop an additive PTAS for DkBS for particular classes of graphs (including ones with low-rank adjacency matrices). This paper supplements prior work by developing an approximation algorithm whose running time is parametrized by the maximum degree of the given graph, and not by the rank of its adjacency matrix.
Techniques
Our algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium relies on finding a near-optimal solution of a bilinear program (BP). The BP we consider was formulated by Mangasarian and Stone [25] and its optimal (near-optimal) solutions correspond to exact (approximate) Nash equilibria of the given game. Below we provide a sketch of our algorithm that determines a near-optimal solution of this BP.
The variables of the BP, x and y, correspond to probability distributions that are mixed strategies of the players and its objective is to maximize x T Cy, where C is the sum of the payoff matrices of the game.
6 Suppose we knew the vector u := Cŷ, for some Nash equilibrium (x,ŷ). Then, a Nash equilibrium can be efficiently computed by solving a linear program (with variables x and y) that is obtained by modifying the BP as follows: replace x T Cy by x T u as the objective and include the constraint Cy = u. Section 4 shows that this idea can be used to find an approximate Nash equilibrium, even if u is not exactly equal to Cŷ but close to it. That is, to find an approximate Nash equilibrium it suffices to have a vector u for which Cŷ − u p is small.
To apply the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem we observe that Cŷ is a vector in the convex hull of the columns of C. Also, note that in the context of (additive) approximate Nash equilibria the payoff matrices are normalized, hence the absolute value of any entry of C is no more than, say, 2. This entry-wise normalization implies that if no column of C has more than s non-zero entries, then the log s norm of the columns is a fixed constant:
, where C i is the ith column of C and norm p = log s. This is a simple but critical observation, since it implies that, modulo a small scaling factor, the columns of C lie in the log s-unit ball. At this point we can apply the approximate version of Carathéo-dory's theorem to guarantee that close to Cŷ there exists a vector u that can be expressed as a convex combination of about p = log s columns of C. We show in Section 4 that exhaustively searching for u takes n O(log s) time, where n is the number of columns of C. Therefore, we can find a vector close to Cŷ and, hence, determine a near-optimal solution of the bilinear program. This way we get an approximate Nash equilibrium and the running time of the algorithm is dominated by the exhaustive search.
Overall, this template for approximating Nash equilibria in sparse games is made possible by the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem. It is notable that our algorithmic framework employs arbitrary norms p ∈ [2, ∞), and in this sense it goes beyond standard ε-net-based results that typically use norms 1, 2, or ∞.
The algorithmic approach outlined above applies to any bilinear program in which the objective matrix is column (or row) sparse and the feasible region is contained in the simplex. We use this observation to develop an additive approximation for DkBS. It was shown in [3] that DkBS can be formulated as a bilinear program. In this program, the matrix in the objective (i.e., the bilinear form) is the adjacency matrix of the graph; hence, its column sparsity corresponds to the maximum degree of the graph. Intuitively, our result for DkBS follows from these observations.
Organization
We
The full version of the paper [4] contains omitted proofs; an exposition of the proof techniques is given in the Introduction. The complete version also presents an extension of the result stated in Section 3 to convex hulls of matrices and details approximate versions of the colorful Carathéo-dory theorem and Tverberg's theorem.
NOTATION
Write x p to denote the p-norm of a vector x ∈ R d . The Euclidean norm is denoted by x , i.e., we drop the subscript from x 2. The number of non-zero components of a vector x is specified via the 0 "norm":
Given a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ R d , we use the standard abbreviation conv(X) for the convex hull of X. A vector y ∈ conv(X) is said to be k uniform with respect to X if there exists a size k multiset S of [n] such that y = 1 k i∈S xi. In particular, if vector y is k uniform with respect to X then y can be expressed as a convex combination of at most k vectors from X. Throughout, the set X will be clear from context so we will simply say that a vector is k uniform and not explicitly mention the fact that uniformity is with respect to X.
APPROXIMATE VERSION OF CARATHÉ-ODORY'S THEOREM
A key technical ingredient in our proof is Khintchine inequality (see, e.g., [18] and [23] ). The following form of the inequality is derived from a result stated in [28] ; see the full version of the paper [4] for a proof. for all i ∈ [m]. In addition, let u1, u2, . . . , um ∈ R d be a deterministic sequence of vectors.
We are ready to state the main result of this section. Note that in the following theorem the scaling term γ is defined with respect to the p norm.
Theorem 2. Given a set of vectors X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ R d and ε > 0. For every µ ∈ conv(X) and 2 ≤ p < ∞ there exists a Proof. Express µ ∈ conv(X) as a convex combination of xis: µ = n i=1 αixi where αi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ [n], and n i=1 αi = 1. Note that α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) corresponds to a probability distribution over vectors x1, x2, . . . , xn. That is, under probability distribution α vector xi is drawn with probability αi. The vector µ is the mean of this distribution. Specifically, the jth component of µ is the expected value of the random variable that takes value xi,j with probability αi, here xi,j is the jth component of vector xi. We succinctly express these component-wise equalities as follows: 
The key technical part of the remainder of the proof is to show that
For m = ε 2 we have Pr(g ≤ ε) > 0, i.e., with positive probability the sample mean vector is ε close to µ in the p-norm. Overall, the stated claim is implied by the probabilistic method.
Recall that in expectation the sampled mean is equal to µ, i.e., E v 1 ,...,v m ∼α
Note that · p is convex for p ≥ 1. Therefore, Jensen's inequality gives us:
Let r1, r2, . . . , rm be a sequence of i.i.d. Rademacher ±1 random variables, i.e., Pr(ri = ±1) = 
The last step follows from triangle inequality. Starting with the tower property, we get the following chain of equalities:
The above mentioned equalities lead to the following:
Overall, (2), (3), (4), and (5) imply
where r1, r2, . . . , rm is a sequence of i.i.d. Rademacher ±1 random variables. At this point we can apply Theorem 1 (Khintchine inequality) with ui = v i m to obtain
Inequality (7) uses the fact that random vectors vi are supported over X, so vi 2 p ≤ γ 2 . Using (6) and (8) we get
This completes the proof.
We end this section by stating an ∞-norm variant of our result. This theorem follows directly from Hoeffding's inequality. Note that in the following theorem the scaling of vectors in X is with respect to the ∞-norm.
Theorem 3. Given a set of vectors X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ R d , with maxx∈X x ∞ ≤ 1, and ε > 0. For every µ ∈ conv(X) there exists an O log n ε 2 uniform vector µ ∈ conv(X) such that µ − µ ∞ ≤ ε.
Proof. Apply Hoeffding's inequality component wise and take union bound.
COMPUTING APPROXIMATE NASH EQUI-LIBRIUM
Bimatrix Games. Bimatrix games are two player games in normal form. Such games are specified by a pair of n × n matrices (A, B), which are termed the payoff matrices for the players. The first player, also called the row player, has payoff matrix A, and the second player, or the column player, has payoff matrix B. The strategy set for each player is [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and, if the row player plays strategy i and column player plays strategy j, then the payoffs of the two players are Aij and Bij respectively. The payoffs of the players are normalized between −1 and 1, so Aij, Bij
Let ∆ n be the set of probability distributions over the set of pure strategies [n] . For x ∈ ∆ n , we define Supp(x) := {i | xi = 0}. Similarly, for a vector v ∈ R n write Supp(v) to denote the set {i | vi = 0}. Further, ei ∈ R n is the vector with 1 in the ith coordinate and 0's elsewhere. The players can randomize over their strategies by selecting any probability distribution in ∆ n , called a mixed strategy. When the row and column players play mixed strategies x and y respectively, the expected payoff of the row player is x T Ay and the expected payoff of the column player is x T By.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium).
A mixed strategy pair (x, y), x, y ∈ ∆ n , is said to be a Nash equilibrium if and
By definition, if (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium neither the row player nor the column player can benefit, in expectation, by unilaterally deviating to some other strategy. We say that a mixed strategy pair is an ε-Nash equilibrium is no player can benefit more than ε, in expectation, by unilateral deviation. Formally, Definition 2 (ε-Nash Equilibrium). A mixed strategy pair (x, y), x, y ∈ ∆ n , is said to be an ε-Nash equilibrium if and only if x T Ay ≥ e T i Ay − ε for all i ∈ [n] and
Throughout, we will write C to denote the sum of payoff matrices, C := A + B. We will denote the ith column of C by C i , for i ∈ [n]. Note that C i 0 is equal to the number of non-zero entries in the ith column of C.
In the following definition we ensure that the sparsity parameter s is at least 4 for ease of presentation. In particular, the running time of our algorithm depends on the log of the number of non-zero entries in the columns of C, i.e., log of the sparsity of the columns of matrix C. Setting s ≥ 4 gives us log s ≥ 2. This allows us to state a single runningtime bound, which holds even for corner cases wherein the column sparsity is, say, zero (and hence log(maxi C i 0) is undefined). The quantitative connection between the sparsity of a game and the time it takes to compute an ε-Nash equilibrium is stated below.
Definition 3 (s-Sparse Games
n×n be the payoff matrices of an s-sparse bimatrix game. Then, an ε-Nash equilibrium of (A, B) can be computed in time n O log s ε 2 .
Our algorithm for computing ε-Nash equilibrium relies on the following bilinear program, which was formulated by Mangasarian and Stone [25] . As formally specified in Lemma 1 below, approximate solutions of this bilinear program correspond to approximate Nash equilibria.
Here 1 denotes the all-ones vector. Using the definition of Nash equilibrium one can show that the optimal solutions of this bilinear program correspond to Nash equilibria of the game (A, B) . Formally, we have Theorem 5 (Equivalence Theorem [25] ). Mixed strategy pair (x,ŷ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) if and only ifx,ŷ,π1, andπ2 form an optimal solution of the bilinear program (BP), for some scalarsπ1 andπ2. In addition, the optimal value achieved by (BP) is equal to zero and the payoffs of the row and column player at this equilibrium areπ1 andπ2 respectively.
A relevant observation is that that an approximate solution of the bilinear program corresponds to an ε-Nash equilibrium. The following lemma is proved in the full version of the paper. Lemma 1. Let x, y ∈ ∆ n along with scalars π1 and π2 form a feasible solution of (BP) that achieves an objective function value more than −ε, i.e., x T Cy ≥ π1 + π2 − ε. Then, (x, y) is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B).
Algorithm 1 solves the following p-norm minimization problem, with p ≥ 2. The program CP(u) is parametrized by vector u ∈ R n and it can be solved in polynomial time. This follows from the fact that, for a fixed u, CP(u) is a convex program. Specifically, given u ∈ R n and matrix C ∈ R n×n , for p ≥ 1, the function f (x) := Cx − u p is convex.
Ay ≤ 1π1
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing ε-Nash equilibrium in s-sparse games Given payoff matrices A, B ∈ [−1, 1] n×n and ε > 0; Return: ε-Nash equilibrium of (A, B) 1: Write s to denote the sparsity of the game (A, B) and let p = log s. {Note that, by definition, s ≥ 4; hence, p ≥ 2.} 2: Let U be the collection of all multisets of {1, 2, . . . , n} of cardinality at most κ p ε 2 , where κ is a fixed constant. 3: Write C i to denote the ith column of matrix C = A+B, for i ∈ [n]. 4: for all multisets S ∈ U do 5:
{u is an |S|-uniform vector in the convex hull of the columns of C.} 6:
Solve convex program CP(u).
7:
if the objective function value of CP(u) is less than ε/2 then 8:
Return (x, y), where x and y form an optimal solution of CP(u). 9:
end if 10: end for
To establish the correctness of the algorithm we note that the convex program CP(u) yields an ε-Nash equilibrium if the vector u is ε-close to Cŷ, for some Nash equilibrium (x,ŷ); this fact is formally proved in the full version of the paper. Now, observe that Cŷ is a vector in the convex hull of the columns of C. Moreover, since the payoff matrices are normalized, the absolute value of any entry of matrix C is no more than, say, 2. This entry-wise normalization implies that if no column of matrix C has more than s nonzero entries, then the log s norm of the columns is a fixed constant:
, where C i is the ith column of C and norm p = log s. Therefore, modulo a small scaling factor, the columns of an C lie in the log s-unit ball.
At this point we can apply the approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem to guarantee that close to Cŷ there exists a vector u that can be expressed as a convex combination of about p = log s columns of C. Exhaustively searching for u takes n O(log s) time, where n is the number of columns of C. Thus, we can find a vector close to Cŷ and then compute an approximate Nash equilibrium by solving CP(u). The running time of the algorithm is dominated by the exhaustive search. A complete proof of Theorem 4 appears in the full version of the paper [4] .
It is worth pointing out that ideas developed in this section can address other notions of sparsity as well. Specifically, if there exist scalars α, β ∈ R+ and γ ∈ R such that the matrix αA + βB + γ1n×n has column or row sparsity s, then our algorithm can be used to find an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) in time n O λ 2 log s ε 2
; here, 1n×n is the all-ones n × n matrix and λ := max{α, β, 1/α, 1/β}. This follows from the fact that a (min{α, β} ε)-Nash equilibrium of the game (αA, βB + γ1n×n) is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) .
, we can compute ε-Nash equilibria of games in which both matrices A and B have column or row sparsity s. Note that this case is not a direct corollary of Theorem 4. In particular, if the columns of matrix A and the rows of matrix B are s sparse, then it is not necessary that A + B has low column or row sparsity. But, an approximate equilibrium of such a game can be computed by exhaustively searching for vectors, v and w, that are ε/4-close (under the log s-norm distance) to Aŷ and x T B respectively, here (x,ŷ) is a Nash equilibrium of (A, B). In this case, instead of CP(u), we need to solve a convex program that minimizes Ay − v log s + B T x − w log s and has the following constraint x T v +w T y ≥ π1 +π2 −ε/2 along with the constraints present in (BP). We can show that this program finds an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) by directly extending the proof of Theorem 4, which appears in the full version of the paper [4] . Remark 1. Consider the class of games in which the p norm of the columns of matrix C is a fixed constant. A simple modification of the arguments mentioned above shows that for such games an ε-Nash equilibrium can be computed
Remark 2. Algorithm 1 can be adopted to find an approximate Nash equilibrium with large social welfare (the total payoffs of the players). Specifically, in order to determine whether there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium with social welfare more than α − ε, we include the constraint π1 + π2 ≥ α in CP(u). The time complexity of the algorithm stays the same, and then via a binary search over α we can find an approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal social welfare.
Remark 3. In Algorithm 1, instead of the convex program CP(u), we can solve the linear program with objective min Cy − u ∞ and constraints identical to CP(u). Algorithm 1 still finds an approximate Nash, since Cy − u ∞ ≤ Cy − u p and we have |x
(1 and ∞ are Hölder conjugates of each other).
Solving a linear program, in place of a convex program, would lead to a polynomial improvement in the running time of the algorithm. But, minimizing the p norm of Cy − u remains useful in specific cases; in particular, it provides a better running-time bound when the game is guaranteed to have a "small probability" equilibrium. We detail this result in the following Section.
Small Probability Games
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [16] showed that there exists a PTAS for games that contain an equilibrium with small-specifically, O 1 n -probability values. This result is somewhat surprisingly, since such small-probability equilibria have large-Ω(n)-support, and hence are not amenable to, say, exhaustive search. This section shows that if a game has an equilibrium with probability values O 1 m , for some 1 ≤ m ≤ n, then an approximate equilibrium can be computed in time n O(k/ε 2 ) , where k has a logarithmic dependence on s/m. Since column sparsity s is no more than n, we get back the result of [16] as a special case.
Definition 4 (Small Probability Equilibrium).
A Nash equilibrium (x, y) is said to be m-small probability if all the entries of x and y are at most 1 m .
In [16] a PTAS is given for games that have an equilibrium with probability values at most 1 δn , for some fixed constant δ ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, the setting of [16] corresponds to games that have δn-small probability equilibrium. Next we state a result for general m-small probability equilibria; its proof appears in the complete version of the paper. n×n be the payoff matrices of an s-sparse bimatrix game. If (A, B) contains an msmall probability Nash equilibrium, then an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game can be computed in time n 
DENSEST BIPARTITE SUBGRAPH
This section presents an additive approximation for the densest k-bipartite subgraph (DkBS) problem. In DkBS we are given a graph G = (V, E) along with a size parameter k ≤ |V | and the goal is to find size-k vertex subsets, S and T , such that the density of edges between S and T is maximized. Specifically, the bipartite density of vertex subsets S and T is defined as follows: ρ(S, T ) := |E(S,T )| |S||T | , here E(S, T ) denotes the set of edges that connect S and T .
We use ρ * k (G) to denote the optimal bipartite density of the graph, i.e., ρ * k (G) := max S,T ⊂V :|S|,|T |=k ρ(S, T ). Note that the subsets S and T are not required to be disjoint.
Next we state a bilinear program from [3] to approximate DkBS. Here, A denotes the adjacency matrix of the given graph G and n = |V |. Note that optimizing (BP-DkBS) over x, with a fixed y, corresponds to solving a linear program. Therefore, for any fixed y there exists an optimal basic feasible x, and vice versa. In other words, for any feasible pair (x0, y0) we can find (x, y), such that x T 0 Ay0 ≤ x T Ay and the all the components of x and y are either 0 or 1/k. This observation implies that the optimal value of (BP-DkBS) is equal to ρ * k (G). In addition, given an additive ε-approximate solution of (BP-DkBS), (x , y ), we can efficiently determine an ε-approximate solution of DkBS. Specifically, we can assume without loss of generality that x and y are basic, and then for S := Supp(x ) and T := Supp(y ) we have ρ(S , T ) ≥ ρ * k (G) − ε. In other words, in order to determine an approximate solution of DkBS it suffices to compute an approximate solution of (BP-DkBS). To complete the argument, next we show that (BP-DkBS) can be efficiently approximated when the column sparsity of the adjacency
